Fundamentals of criminal law : responsibility, culpability, and wrongdoing / A P Simester.
Material type: TextPublisher: Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2021Edition: First editionDescription: xxii, 513 pages : illustrations ; 24 cmContent type:- text
- unmediated
- volume
- 9780198853145
- 0198853149
- 23 345 SIM
- K5018 .S577 2021
Item type | Current library | Call number | Copy number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Book | Law section Open Access Section | 345 SIM (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | 1 | Available | 10018 | ||
Book | Law section Open Access Section | 345 SIM (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | 2 | Available | 10017 | ||
Book | Law section Open Access Section | 345 SIM (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | 3 | Available | 10016 |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Crime, responsibility, culpability, and wrongdoing -- 2. Structure and nomenclature -- 3. Five functions, and two kinds, of Mens Rea -- 4. Moral and ascriptive responsibilities -- 5. Causation -- 6. Why not-doings are special -- 7. Complicity -- 8. Moral responsibility and voluntariness -- 9. (Non-volitional) action -- 10. Prolegomenon to part III -- 11. A pluralistic theory of culpability -- 12. Being unreasonable -- 13. Strict and constructive liability -- 14. Outcome and other luck -- 15. Distinguishing intended from advertent action -- 16. On the moral distinction between intention and advertence.
Written by a noted expert in criminal law, this book explores the philosophical underpinnings of the law's major doctrines concerning actus reus, mens rea, and defences, showing that they are not always driven by culpability. They are grounded also in principles of moral responsibility, ascriptive responsibility, and wrongdoing. As such, they engage wider debates about wrongdoing, and about the boundaries between liability and freedom. This multi-textured analysis allows this book to take more nuanced positions about many important controversies in criminal law. It argues, for example, that liability for omissions and for negligence-and even some strict liability elements-can sometimes be legitimate yet, at the same time, should be relatively rare. It also explains why principles of causation can differ in the criminal law from other contexts; what is wrong with the 'voluntary act' requirement; and why luck can affect the wrongs we commit without changing our degree of blameworthiness for committing them. The book concludes with an account of the major types of defences, and of how they interact with an agent's wrong and her underlying motivations.This volume presents a coherent and rich vision of the criminal law that, by its sheer breadth, makes a distinctive contribution to the literature, of interest to lawyers and philosophers alike.
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